enters into the scale because liberals express some reserve about national symbols as a lingering historical consequence of opposition to the Vietnam War, in which flag burning became synonymous with liberal, antiwar sentiment. As a consequence, support for symbolic patriotism is stronger among conservatives than liberals, raising needed questions about its utility as a broad measure of patriotism (Conover and Feldman 1987 Schatz, Staub, and colleagues deal with ideological asymmetry in the measurement of patriotism by distinguishing between constructive and blind patriotism. This distinction is designed to differentiate a conservative aspect of patriotism (blind) from one that is more likely to be endorsed by liberals or perhaps those on both sides of the ideological divide (constructive). Blind, or what we refer to as uncritical patriotism (to get around the normative implications of the term blind), is defined as "an unwillingness both to criticize and accept criticism" of the nation and is indexed by items such as "my country right or wrong" (Schatz and Staub 1997, 231; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999). Uncritical patriotism is linked to authoritarianism, which is characterized, in turn, by a tendency to defer to authority figures and support them unconditionally. And authoritarians are typically conservative (although not all conservatives are authoritarians), producing higher levels of uncritical patriotism among political conservatives, on average (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999). Uncritical patriotism is, therefore, not a good measure of broad patriotism because it is both ideologically divisive and closely aligned with nationalism and ethnocentrism, blurring the distinction between patriotism and nationalism.
Schatz and Staub developed a scale of constructive patriotism that encapsulates a form of patriotism more acceptable to liberals. Constructive patriotism is defined as "an attachment to country characterized by critical loyalty" and "questioning and criticism" driven by "a desire for positive change" (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999, 153) . Constructive patriots agree with items such as "I oppose some U.S. policies because I care about my country and want to improve it" and "I express my love for America by supporting efforts at positive change." Despite expectations that it would gain stronger endorsement from liberals, constructive patriotism is empirically unrelated to political ideology, increasing its potential as a measure of broad, nondivisive patriotism (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999). Unfortunately, there are several problems with the scale that limit its empirical utility.
First, items in the constructive patriotism scale are complex, mixing a love of country with political efforts directed at a change in the status quo. Scale items may primarily detect love of country and thus reflect a broad sense of national attachment, but they may also confound patriotism with political interest, involvement, and activity (Rothi, Lyons, and Chryssochoou 2005; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999). Schatz and colleagues find a clear link between political involvement and constructive patriotism, but this further muddies the waters. Is constructive patriotism primarily a measure of patriotism? Or of political interest and involvement? Current research fails to clearly resolve this issue. Second, all of the agree-disagree items in the constructive scale are worded in a positive direction, introducing problematic acquiescence bias (Schuman and Presser 1981) . This problem is difficult to fix because the compound nature of constructive patriotism items makes scale items difficult to reverse. Should items be reversed by stating that one's efforts at change do not arise from a love of country? Or that Americans should not work towards positive change?
Third, the empirical measure of constructive patriotism is not clearly differentiated from that of blind patriotism, blurring the meaning of both concepts. Consider the following example. The blind patriotism scale contains the following reverse-worded item: "For the most part, people who protest and demonstrate against U.S. policy are good, upstanding, intelligent people." This seems conceptually similar to the following item from the constructive patriotism scale: "If you love America, you should notice its problems and work to correct them." But the two scales (blind and constructive) are unrelated (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999 
Student Studies
Both student studies included responses from students at 
General Social Survey (GSS)
The 1996 General Social Survey (GSS) includes 2,904 respondents drawn from the adult household population of the United States. The sample is split into two halves, with each split half randomly assigned to one of three questionnaire "ballots" resulting in six different conditions. The survey included a special national identity module developed by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Roughly half (1,367) of all individuals answered questions related to patriotism and national identity, of whom 1,285 are citizens. Our effective subsample is further reduced to 680 citizens who were asked a number of added national identity questions, including a critical component of the national identity scale. We refer to this throughout as "the GSS subsample." This GSS subsample included 283 (42%) male, 397 (58%) female, 96 (14%) black, and 555 (82%) white respondents. Their median age is 44 with an average of 13 years of education.
Analytic Strategy
We employ structural equation modeling (SEM) to investigate the structure of national attachments and their relationships with various aspects of political involvement. There has been a proliferation of national attachment measures, many of which are interrelated and depend on similar questions or question formats. The use of SEM identifies the underlying structure of opinions by incorporating well-specified measurement models in place of traditional summed scales or mean scores and controls for measurement error. When dealing with Likert agree-disagree response items, all items are loaded on both a common method covariance or style factor (with all loadings set to 1) and a substantive factor to correct for acquiescence bias (with the exception of the constructive patriotism scale in which all items are in the same direction and cannot be loaded on a style factor).
All analyses are conducted using maximumlikelihood estimation, except for two models with discrete dependent variables that were estimated with weighted least squares and noted in the text.2 We report robust standard errors for all parameter estimates. All models were estimated using the Mplus? statistical package, which pro- Uncritical patriotism was comprised of seven items from Schatz, Staub, and Lavine's (1999) blind patriotism scale.5 Table 1 includes the wording of all national attachment items in the 2004 student study.
Levels of national identity were high in both student studies, with over 65% of students referring to Americans as "we" most or all of the time and reporting that "American" was a term that described them very or somewhat well. Levels of national identity are also high in the GSS sample, with over 80% of all respondents rating themselves at 6 or above on a 0 to 10 scale on the importance of being American. Student support for symbolic patriotism and constructive patriotism was similarly high, with relatively few reporting that the flag and anthem did not make them feel good or that they did not support efforts at positive change. In contrast, uncritical patriotism and nationalism were less pervasive. Sixty-one percent of students disagreed in 2002 with the statement that they would "support their country right or wrong," and only 38% of the GSS subsample agreed somewhat or strongly with the statement that "the world would be a better place if other people were more like Americans." 2All items containing four or more response options are estimated assuming a continuous latent trait. To avoid violating the assumption of multivariate normality, we also ran models (for items that had less than 10 categories) in which items were treated as categorical (using robust WLS with polychoric correlations) and found comparable results. We report results from the continuous models for their relative ease in interpretation, except where noted in the text. Note: N = 300. One item-loading for each factor is constrained to 1.00 for identification. All items are rescaled to vary between 0 and 1. Cells contain unstandardized factor loadings with standardized estimates in parentheses and standardized factor correlations. All factor loadings and correlations are significant at the 1% level. tIndicates a reversed item.
The confirmatory factor structure for the 2004 student study is presented in Table 1 Note: N = 678. One item-loading for each factor is constrained to 1.00 for identification. All items are rescaled to vary between 0 and 1. Cells contain unstandardized factor loadings with standardized estimates in parentheses. All factor loadings and correlations are significant at the 1% level. involvement instead. Finally, despite strong ties among three of the four national attachments, the four-factor model provided a much better fit to the data than a oneor two-factor model.
The GSS subsample includes measures of national identity, national pride, and nationalism. National identity is assessed in the GSS with three items. National pride, analogous to symbolic patriotism, is assessed with seven items from de Figueiredo and Elkins' (2003) scale.7 Nationalism, which is typically linked to uncritical patriotism, was assessed with two items. The wording of all three item sets is included in Table 2 . Three clear factors emerged in analysis of the GSS data. All three identity items load on one factor, all seven national pride items load on a second, and both nationalism items load on a distinct third factor.8 National identity and national pride are positively related (r = .61), and national pride is positively related to nationalism (r = .65). National pride and nationalism were more weakly related, although still closely aligned (r = .46). Moreover, the three-factor model was a very good fit to the data. The ratio of the chi-squared value to the degrees of freedom was 3.47, an acceptably low value. The RMSEA of .06 indicated a good fit and the normed fit indices are reasonably high: CFI = .92 and TLI = .90. The GSS analysis thus confirms that national identity is distinct from, but positively related to, nationalism and national pride. Once again, the three-factor model was a better fit to the data than a single-or two-factor model.
The Origins of National Identity, Patriotism, and Nationalism
Social identity theory predicts that national identity will be less influenced by political ideology than other forms of patriotism and nationalism. We test this connection by regressing national attachments on self-identified ideology and party identification, measured on a 5-point scale in the student studies and 7 points in the GSS. Analyses also include a series of demographic controls: participant race (dummy variables for Black, White, and other in the GSS and White, Black, Latino, and Asian in the student study); first (born outside the United States), second (both parents born outside the United States), and third immigrant generation (both parents born in the United States); and the percent of an immigrant's life spent in the United States (student studies only). Authoritarianism was included in GSS analyses and is measured as a latent construct indicated by two items: how strongly respondents favor spanking as a form of discipline for children and how important it is for children to obey.9 The political and demographic determinants of national attachments were estimated in regression analyses conducted using Mplus? in which national attachments are modeled as latent constructs, and a single model was estimated for each of the three studies. Overall, the three models demonstrated very good fit. In the student studies, the ratio of the chi-squared value to the degrees of freedom was 1.59 (2002) Table 3 and for the GSS in Table 4 .
Consistent with a distinction in social identity theory between identity and its meaning, national identity is less ideological than symbolic, constructive, or uncritical patriotism. National identity was unrelated to political ideology or partisanship in both student studies. In contrast, conservatives scored consistently higher than liberals on uncritical patriotism in both studies. Unexpectedly, partisanship also affected uncritical patriotism in the 2004 student study, perhaps reflecting the Republican administration's recent emphasis on patriotic loyalty in connection to the Iraq war. The effects of ideology on symbolic patriotism are more mixed. Ideology strongly shaped symbolic patriotism in the 2002 student study but had no effect in 2004. Finally, ideology also influenced constructive patriotism but it was liberals, not conservatives, who scored more highly on the scale. While past research has found no link between ideology and constructive patriotism, stronger liberal endorsement of scale items is consistent with the items' emphasis on progressive change. 8We also modeled two error correlations-one between two of the national identity items (closeness and feeling American, which had similar response options) and one between pride in the country's history and pride in the country's fair and equal treatment of groups.
'GSS respondents ranked the following values in order of their importance "for a child to learn to prepare him or her for life": to obey, be popular or well liked, think for himself or herself, work hard, and help others when they need help. A dummy variable was created for those who ranked "obey" above all else. They were also asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "It is sometimes necessary to discipline a child with a good, hard spanking." The GSS included a measure of authoritarianism, providing a direct test of the relationship between authoritarianism and nationalism. Political ideology has no direct impact on nationalism in the GSS data. But authoritarianism does. This is somewhat surprising given the strong connection between ideology and uncritical patriotism in the student data. But findings are consistent with earlier theoretical expectations that authoritarianism explains the link between ideology and uncritical patriotism (and by extension, nationalism). The impact of authoritarianism on nationalism is sizeable and helps to explain why nationalism (and uncritical patriotism) is associated with lower levels of political involvement. Authoritarians typically support strong leaders and are intolerant of active political dissent; together both forces diminish active political participation (Altemeyer 1988; Feldman and Stenner 1997) . At odds with our expectations, national pride was not ideological in nature and was no stronger among conservatives than liberals.
When taken together, data from both student studies and the GSS indicate that national identity was thoroughly nonideological in nature, consistent with social identity theory. In contrast, symbolic, constructive, and uncritical patriotism, and nationalism were more strongly endorsed by either liberals or conservatives (or authoritarians in the case of nationalism). National pride was the only other measure of national attachment that was not ideological in nature.
One other notable aspect of national identity is the ease with which it develops among immigrants. Not surprisingly, immigrants who had spent longer in the United States more strongly endorsed national identity and symbolic patriotism in both student studies, and uncritical patriotism in 2002, but were no more likely than other students to endorse constructive patriotism. When national identity was added as a predictor of symbolic and uncritical patriotism to the models depicted in Table 3 (in analyses not shown here), it fully mediated the impact of percent of life spent in the United States on both symbolic and uncritical patriotism. This suggests that national identity develops rapidly among young new immigrants and intensifies other forms of national attachment as a consequence. Of course, these mediational analyses imply that national identity is causally prior to symbolic and uncritical patriotism, a causal order that is not well established. National identity remained unaffected by subsequent immigration generation in the 2002 student study but was weaker among second-than thirdgeneration students in 2004. This is an unexpected finding that was also observed for symbolic and uncritical patriotism. Immigrant generation had no effect on national identity, national pride, or nationalism in the GSS data.
Finally, there are several other trends in Tables 3 and 4 that deserve mention. In both student studies, blacks expressed lower levels of all forms of national attachment, as a latent variable consisting of two items. All variables vary from 0 to 1 except age and education, which are both measured in years. *p <.05; **p <.001.
and Asians expressed lower levels of symbolic patriotism in 2002. Blacks also expressed lower levels of national pride but not national identity or nationalism in the GSS.'o Women in the GSS subsample were somewhat less nationalistic and scored lower than men on the national pride scale. They also scored less highly on constructive and symbolic patriotism in the 2004 student study, but did not differ from men in strength of national identity or uncritical patriotism in either student study. Older adults were more likely than younger individuals to hold a strong identity, express greater pride, and endorse nationalism in the GSS data. And better educated individuals held a weaker national identity than those with less education and scored lower on the nationalism scale. The latter finding raises questions as to whether higher levels of education are associated with diminished national identity because better educated individuals are less nationalistic (and nationalism and national identity are related). There was some support for this hypothesis in added mediational analyses (not shown here) in which nationalism fully mediated the effects of education on national identity. But once again, such findings need to be treated with caution given uncertainty as to the true causal relationship between national identity and different forms of patriotism and nationalism.
Political Involvement Political Attention and Knowledge
We now turn to the positive impact of national identity on political engagement. Social identity theory predicts higher levels of political involvement among strong national identifiers because of their greater adherence to group norms. In contrast, other forms of patriotism are not expected to promote political involvement. Political involvement was assessed as attention to politics, knowledge of current events, and voter turnout. We consider political attention and knowledge first. and knowledge. In contrast, constructive patriotism has no effect on political involvement with or without national identity in the analysis. This contradicts past evidence and suggests a weak relationship overall between constructive patriotism and political involvement. Symbolic patriotism has no independent effect on political attention or knowledge. Uncritical patriotism is the only other national attachment to significantly affect political involvement, and its effects are negative as expected. Table 5 . The coefficient for national identity is large, positive, and significant in the GSS. It is also significant in the student data although the effect is not quite as large. Both uncritical patriotism and nationalism depress voter turnout, as expected.
The power of national identity to enhance and uncritical patriotism or nationalism to depress voter turnout is made apparent by examining differences in the predicted probability of voting at different levels of each type of national attachment. Predicted probabilities are calculated from the equations presented in Table 5 for individuals at the 25th (low) and 75th (high) percentiles of national identity and uncritical patriotism or nationalism. All turnout probabilities are estimated for third-generation American white males who are partisan independents and political moderates, and score at the mean on all other independent variables. Consider first the impact of national identity in the student study. For individuals who score at the mean on uncritical patriotism, predicted turnout ranges from a low of .53 among weak national identifiers to a high of .70 among stronger identifiers. Levels of turnout are higher in the GSS sample because the sample is older and confined to citizens. In the GSS, turnout ranges from a low of .86 among weak identifiers to a high of .99 among strong identifiers.
In the student study, uncritical patriotism and nationalism have roughly the same effect on voter turnout as national identity, but in the opposite direction. Thus for students at the mean on national identity strength, the predicted probability of voting ranges from a high of .70 for those low in uncritical patriotism to a low of .48 among those who are high. Likewise, turnout ranges from a predicted probability of .99 for Americans in the GSS subsample low in nationalism to .82 among those high in nationalism and at the mean on national identity.
Other factors play an expected role in driving voter turnout, political interest, and knowledge. Older and bet- 
Conclusion
This research underscores the contribution of social identity theory to the study of patriotism, a field of inquiry that has typically lacked a coherent theoretical focus. According to the theory, a social identity develops readily among all members of a salient group even when members hold differing beliefs (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987 ). This prediction is borne out in the current study in which national identity was consistently unrelated to political ideology on which Americans tend to be divided. In contrast, at least three of the other four forms of assessed patriotism exhibit some degree of ideological bias.
Social identity theory also predicts greater adherence to group norms among strong group identifiers, which translates into greater civic involvement among strong national identifiers in the case of American identity. This prediction received impressive support in our data. Americans with a strong national identity paid more attention to politics, knew more about current events, and were more likely to vote. Moreover, the connection between national attachment and civic engagement is not predicted by any other form of patriotism. The connection between patriotism and civic involvement has been empirically tested by Schatz and colleagues (1999). But findings from the current research make clear that national identity is the only form of national attachment to positively predict political involvement. Overall, social identity theory provides guidance on the measurement of national attachments, produces a nonideological measure that evades contention over the meaning of American patriotism, and generates testable and empirically substantiated predictions that underscore its contribution to research on patriotism.
Social identity theory generates a number of other predictions in addition to those tested in the current research. For example, some researchers have concluded that patriotism is unrelated to outgroup animosity (De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989) . But this conclusion is unlikely to hold during periods of international conflict. According to social identity theory, ingroup and outgroup sentiments are typically distinct because groups evade 12All models in Table 5 The positive connection between national identity and political involvement mirrors the past political effects of constructive patriotism. But our research demonstrates that the effects of national identity are far more robust. Indeed, we uncovered a series of problems with the constructive patriotism scale. First, it was relatively unrelated to national identity and other measures of patriotism, suggesting that it is not part of the same broad concept. Second, it did not predict political interest even when national identity was removed from the analysis, raising questions about its predictive power. And third, it was more strongly endorsed by liberals than conservatives, demonstrating ideological bias and weakening its claim as a broad measure of patriotism. Our findings differ markedly from those reported by Schatz and colleagues, and we can only speculate as to why. We included a measurement model and more extensive controls than Schatz, Staub, and Lavine (1999) in our analysis. But ultimately, further research is needed to fully resolve these discrepancies.
The current findings not only highlight the positive impact of national identity on political involvement; they also reveal the negative effects of uncritical patriotism. Despite being labeled patriots, students who scored highly on uncritical patriotism paid less attention to news about Iraq, were less knowledgeable about events there, and were less likely to have voted in 2002. The same holds for strong nationalists, who were less likely than others to have voted in the 1992 presidential election in GSS data. Uncritical patriotism and nationalism are more ideological than national identity because they are grounded in authoritarianism (as seen in this study for nationalism and in Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999, for uncritical patriotism). And the link between uncritical patriotism and authoritarianism helps to account for the negative effects of uncritical patriotism on political involvement because authoritarians are more likely than others to abnegate decision-making powers to their leaders.
Despite its popularity as a measure of patriotism within political science, symbolic patriotism emerged as the least effective measure of national attachment in this research. It is ideological in flavor (in one of our studies and in other research; see Hurwitz and Peffley 1999). It also overlaps heavily with national identity and uncritical patriotism. In fact, one of the standard NES symbolic patriotism items-reacting angrily to criticism of the United States-loaded on the uncritical patriotism construct in this research. Moreover, symbolic patriotism has no independent effect on measures of political engagement. We suggest that future research abandon this concept in favor of its two components: a more ideologically neutral measure of national identity and the politically powerful concept of uncritical patriotism. The latter two measures provide a potent demonstration of the divergent effects of different forms of national attachments on political involvement that are masked by single measures such as symbolic patriotism.
In sum, our research highlights the value of a social identity approach to the study of national attachments. Past research on patriotism and nationalism has produced a variety of scales and concepts and has often been characterized by conflicting and contradictory terminology and empirical measurement. The introduction of social identity theory adds a strong theoretical focus to this research and generates national identity, an effective measure of national attachment. In the end, a national identity scale may prove to be an important (and nonideological) addition to research on the study of political participation very generally. The introduction of national identity as a measure of national attachment may also help to address Hurwitz and Peffley's (1999) concern that ideological measures of patriotism do not tap broad support for the nation but rather capture more narrow ideological allegiances. Overall, a social identity approach sharpens research on patriotism at a time when Americans are confronted with a proliferation of claims about patriotism's virtues and vices.
